We have not updated this blog since 2023 or so, but research and investigation have continued during the last three years and especially recently. I have continued to request information through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) but this is difficult as we do not always know what there even is out there to request. We have continued to pore over the interviews, books, articles, and stories in hopes of discovering something that would point us in a more definite direction as to where the explosion started and why it happened.
We feel confident that the explosion initiated down the Main West heading. Careful study of the available information seems to eliminate the explored areas. Ventilation studies done during recovery operations clearly found that the mine never was and could never have been adequately ventilated. That night the barometric pressure was low and the air temperature was cold. Under such conditions more methane is liberated from the coal beds. We know that the Mod's Run fan blew up during the night, and that the alarm system that would have alerted the miners to this critical ventilation failure had been bypassed or "jumpered out" at some point PRIOR TO the explosion. There was inadequate rock dusting throughout the mine and there were many shortcomings in the ventilation controls in the mine. Really, the mine was a time bomb, especially that night because of the low barometric pressure, and when you factor in the failed fan you have an incredibly dangerous situation. All that was needed was a spark. The ventilation failures in that mine were the real problem.
Because we believe strongly that the ignition source lies in the unrecovered areas we feel that we will never know just exactly what caused the ignition. One official (Paul J. Componation) claimed to have ironclad knowledge that smoking was the cause, and he also claimed that he was not allowed to publish that finding in the official MSHA report. Did he find evidence of smoking in the mine? That would be a huge safety violation. What did he see or find? What did his report, written with another inspector and then rejected, have to say? This may be the only solid lead on an ignition source. Unfortunately Mr. Componation has passed away, and our ability to see what he knew may be gone. No matter the ignition source, our researched and studied position is that smoking or not, the mine was primed to blow that night, as it had been on MANY nights.
Once our newest FOIA information requests arrive (submitted October 2026) we will analyze them and report. Currently we have a large volume of reports, interviews, articles, and testimonies regarding the disaster. We feel confident that barring Mr. Componation's findings, we will not be able to discern a person or device that was the ignition source. The Main West heading was clearly almost impossible to ventilate properly, and we feel strongly that the ignition occurred down that heading. Most of the people killed in the mine died as a direct result of the initial explosion. Some miners lived a bit longer, finding time to get to emergency equipment and deploy it, and in some cases tried to find a way out. Likely within half an hour or less they were all gone. The conditions of the air and the force of the explosions were just simply not survivable. 55 to 65 pounds per square inch atmospheric pressures are almost universally fatal, and in any kind of explosions this pressure is often the primary cause of death. The damage done to Llewellyn makes it clear that the pressure generated by the explosions was enormous. Frankly, Farmington No. 9 west of Plum Run overcast was not survivable once it ignited. It is a miracle that the 7 South crew got out, except of course for Paul Henderson.
Once we digest the latest round of information requests we will post another update. For now, our understanding of the disaster remains the same. Low barometric pressure made for enormous methane release inside the mine, and inadequate ventilation and poor rock dusting aided in the explosive atmosphere, and the Mods Run fan being down killed the ventilation west of Plum Run, and that is it. All that was needed was a spark. Farmington was a ticking time bomb. Emilio Megna and others had told others about the danger, and about their fear that the mine would explode. We should not blame the source of ignition so much as blame the DANGEROUS CONDITIONS that were present. The bypassing of the Mahan fan is a huge factor in this, but we may never know just who did it and if anyone in management knew about it or ordered it. The safe condition of a work place is the responsibility of those in charge. We will continue to dig and research and ask questions.